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Abstract
How important are the beneﬁts of low price-level uncertainty? This paper explores the desirability
of price-level path targeting in an estimated DSGE model ﬁt to Canadian data. The policy
implications are based on social welfare evaluations. Compared to the historical inﬂation targeting
rule, an optimal price level targeting regime substantially reduces the welfare cost of business
cycle ﬂuctuations in terms of steady state consumption. The optimal price-level targeting rule
performs also better than the optimal inﬂation targeting rule in minimizing the distortion
generated by the presence of nominal debt contracts. The occurrence of ﬁnancial shocks, which
are among the main sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the model, signiﬁcantly contributes
to quantify the welfare gains of price level targeting.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E32, E52
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial stability; Inﬂation and prices; Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Quelle est l’importance des gains que procure une faible incertitude du niveau des prix? Les
auteurs explorent les mérites d’une cible déﬁnie par rapport au niveau des prix dans le cadre d’un
modèle d’équilibre général dynamique et stochastique étalonné en fonction de données
canadiennes. Les conclusions qu’ils en tirent pour la conduite de la politique monétaire se fondent
sur des évaluations du bien-être. Un régime optimal axé sur la poursuite d’une cible de niveau des
prix permet de réduire considérablement la perte de bien-être (mesuré par la consommation en
régime permanent) liée aux ﬂuctuations conjoncturelles comparativement au régime actuel de
cible d’inﬂation. Ce régime réussit également mieux que le régime optimal de cible d’inﬂation à
minimiser les distortions créées par la présence de contrats de prêt formulés en termes nominaux.
La simulation de chocs ﬁnanciers, qui constituent l’une des principales sources des ﬂuctuations
économiques dans le modèle, facilite la quantiﬁcation des gains de bien-être associés à la
poursuite d’une cible de niveau des prix.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E32, E52
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Stabilité ﬁnancière; Inﬂation et prix; Cadre de la politique
monétaire1. Introduction
The principal objective of most central banks worldwide is the maintenance of price stability.1 Inﬂa-
tion targeting, which aims keeping inﬂation within a target range, has proved successful in sustaining
low inﬂation and low inﬂation volatility. However, some central banks have recently started investi-
gating the costs and beneﬁts of deﬁning the target in terms of a price level path rather than an inﬂation
rate. Announcing a path for the price level would provide an operational target and be equivalent to
targeting a long-run average inﬂation rate, but would not require central banks to stabilize inﬂation in
the short-run. Under such a regime, the central bank aims at correcting deviations of the price level
from the target using inﬂationary or deﬂationary policies to bring the price level back to its target in a
given period of time.
In order to assess the beneﬁts of low price-level uncertainty, our analysis is based on a medium-
scale DSGE model that takes into account several sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The model
extends the framework adopted in Dib and Christensen (2008) to a multi-sector small open economy
with nominal debt contracts in both the domestic and international credit market and credit frictions
` a la Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).2 In particular, we focus on the role of shocks to the
domestic and international credit market in business cycle ﬂuctuations and optimal monetary policy.
To provide a quantitative assessment of different sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations, we ﬁrst
ﬁt the model to Canadian data using data from 1981:1 to 2007:2. Our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial
and investment-speciﬁc shocks are the main sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the Canadian
economy. In particular, approximately 10 percent of the variability in GDP, investment, and the real
exchange rate can be attributed to international ﬁnancial shocks. However, these shocks slightly
account for the variability in consumption and asset prices.
Unlike most of the previous literature on price-level versus inﬂation targeting, the optimal design
of monetary policy under the two alternative regimes is based on social welfare evaluations. To
maximize welfare, optimal monetary policy rules should aim to minimize the distortions featured
in the model. With nominal price and wage stickiness, a strong anti-inﬂationary stance is needed
to reduce the cost of price and wage dispersion and increase economic activity and welfare. Assets
in nominal terms induce private risk generated by the uncertain returns. In particular, nominal debt
1Nowadays, Australia, Canada, European Monetary Union, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and United Kingdom
adopt an explicit target for inﬂation.
2See Iacoviello (2005) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004, 2007) for closed economy models with nominal
contracts and frictions in the domestic credit market.
1contracts generate unnecessary redistribution of wealth between borrowers and lenders as a result of
unexpected changes in the debt-services. Since entrepreneurs borrow from ﬁnancial intermediaries
to ﬁnance part of their capital acquisitions, variations in the price level generate distortions in the
allocation of resources and thus affect the economic activity. Therefore, stabilizing the debt-services
through the stabilization of the real interest rate would minimize the allocative distortions generated
by the debt-deﬂation channel and improve welfare. Mendicino and Pescatori (2005), show that the
monetary authority faces a trade-off between the minimization of the nominal debt distortion and the
inefﬁciency generated by nominal price stickiness. Under a Taylor-type rule, to reduce the volatility
of the real interest rate, monetary policy generates an optimal degree of inﬂation volatility and does
not completely eliminate the inefﬁciency linked to price dispersion.
Our ﬁndings show that an optimal price level targeting rule signiﬁcantly reduces the welfare cost
of business cycle ﬂuctuations in terms of steady state consumption when compared to the historical
inﬂation targeting rule. The price level targeting regime dominates in terms of welfare since it delivers
lower variability in the real interest rate, which minimizes the distortion generated by the existence
of nominal debt, and signiﬁcantly reduces the cost of price and wage dispersion. Price-level targeting
also outperforms the inﬂation targeting regime in the class of optimal non-inertial rules. Due to
history dependence, the optimal price-level targeting rule requires a less aggressive response to the
target in order to perform at least as well as the optimal inﬂation targeting rule in minimizing the
inefﬁciencylinkedtopricestickiness. Theresultingreductioninthevolatilityofthepolicyratefurther
minimizes the distortion generated by the presence of debt in nominal terms. Thus, the optimal price-
level targeting rule performs generally better in terms of welfare than the optimal inﬂation targeting
rule. However, the introduction of history dependence through interest rate smoothing improves the
performance of the inﬂation targeting rule and substantially reduces the gains of adopting a price level
targeting stance.
Some authors have argued that the presence of uncertainty signiﬁcantly affects the comparison
between the two monetary policy regimes. Recently, Aoki and Nikolov (2005) show that in a New-
Keynesian model, a price-level targeting rule implies bigger gains in terms of output and inﬂation
volatility in the presence of uncertainty.3 Our paper contributes to the debate about uncertainty and
3Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2005) document that price-level targeting outperforms inﬂation-targeting under uncer-
tainty about the potential output. Cateau (2008) using the actual projection model of the Bank of Canada, shows that the
gains of price-level targeting are robust to model uncertainty. In particular, he ﬁnds that if the correct model is a robust
control version of the projection model, the optimal price-level targeting rule is robust in models that are at a reasonable
distance from the reference model. These recent results are in contrast with the conventional view suggesting that when
2price-level targeting by analyzing the effects of parameter uncertainty in relation to the model’s en-
dogenous welfare measure instead of ad-hoc policy functions. We show that welfare exhibits little
sensitivity to uncertainty about the model’s parameters. The beneﬁts of adopting a price-level tar-
geting regime are more sizeable when uncertainty is related to the persistence and volatility of the
shocks. However, compared to the optimal inﬂation targeting rule, the magnitude of the welfare gains
of adopting the optimal price level targeting rule is unchanged and the beneﬁts related to the variabil-
ity of welfare are not quantitatively important. According to our model, the presence of parameter
uncertainty does not signiﬁcantly increase the welfare gains of adopting a price level targeting regime.
Our ﬁndings also highlight the importance of understanding the source of business cycle ﬂuctu-
ations when assessing the beneﬁts of alternative monetary policy regimes. In fact, the gains from
price-level targeting are signiﬁcantly linked to the occurrence of ﬁnancial shocks, which are among
the main sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the estimated model considered in this paper.
Layout. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature and highlights the
contribution of our paper. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the estimation method
andthequantitativepropertiesofthemodel. Section5assessesthedesirabilityofalternativemonetary
policy rules and section 6 conducts sensitivity analysis for parameter uncertainty. Section 7 presents
the conclusions of the study.
2. Related Literature
Since Taylor (1979), the output-inﬂation volatility trade-off criterion has been used to rank alterna-
tive policy rules. Several authors compared the effects of loss functions that involve either inﬂation
variability or price-level variability. According to the conventional view in central banking, dating
back to Fischer (1994), in the presence of nominal rigidities, a price level targeting regime would in-
crease both inﬂation and output volatility in the short-run.4 Thus, there would be a trade-off between
long-term price-level variability and short-term volatility of inﬂation and output gap. Svensson (1999)
shows that a trade-off between less low-frequency price-level variability and less high-frequency in-
the central bank faces uncertainty about the structure of the economy, a price-level targeting regime could increase the
cost of policy mistakes and increase macroeconomic volatility. See Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007) for a review of the
literature.
4See also Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1992), Fillion and Tetlow (1994), Haldane and Salmon (1995), Laxton,
Ricketts and Rose (1994).
3ﬂation and employment variability arises from the use of exogenous reaction functions for monetary
policy or exogenous inﬂation and price level processes. These are not necessarily consistent with the
objective function of the central bank and the constraints implicitly imposed by the model. Deriving
endogenous decision rules, and equilibrium price level and inﬂation, Svensson documented that under
rational expectations and (at least) moderate persistence in employment, a price-level targeting path
leads to lower inﬂation and identical output variability.5
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999) highlight the fact that in a forward-looking
model optimal monetary policy under commitment is characterized by a stationary price level. 6Vestin
(2006) shows that under discretion price-level targeting is also preferred. If the central bank com-
mits to price-level targeting, then rational expectations become automatic stabilizers. Nevertheless,
Kryvtsov, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2008) showed that under imperfect credibility, the effectiveness
of the expectation channel is weakened and the welfare gains of price-level targeting are substantially
reduced. 7
The approach adopted in this paper characterizes monetary policy in terms of interest-rate feed-
back rules and assumes that the policymaker credibly commits to a policy rule for the entire future.
In particular, we assume commitment to a policy rule that determines the nominal interest rate as a
function of the lagged nominal interest rate, GDP and either inﬂation or the price-level. Batini and
Yates (2003) investigate the implications of price-level targeting, inﬂation targeting, and hybrid rules.
They document that the performance of the rules in terms of inﬂation and output volatility depends
on several modeling assumptions, including the degree of forward-lookingness in the price-setting
behavior of ﬁrms. Williams (1999), using the FRB/US large-scale model, shows that price-level
targeting rules outperform rules that react to a 1-year inﬂation rate and perform nearly as well as
inﬂation targeting rules that react to a multi-period inﬂation rate.
We evaluate the performance of the two regimes in terms of welfare rather than ad-hoc loss func-
tions. Following the same criterion, Giannoni (2000) argues that in a simple forward-looking model,
price-level targeting rules generally perform better than Taylor rules because they result in lower wel-
fare loss and lower variability of inﬂation and of the nominal interest rate. On the contrary, Ortega and
5Duguay(1994)andCoulombe(1998)alsodocumentthatapriceleveltargetpathimpliesexpectationstohelpresisting
deﬂation and profound downturns if the economy falls into a zero-lower-bound situation.
6Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007) show that under optimal policy under commitment the price level is stationary even
in larger-scale models that include several frictions such as the estimated model of the Euro area by Smets and Wouters
(2003).
7See a more detailed discussion of credibility and price-level targeting in Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007).
4Rebei (2006), using a two sector small open economy model ﬁt to Canadian data, ﬁnd that the welfare
gains of price-level targeting are negligible. Using a more elaborate two-sector model enriched with
credit ﬂows, we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of price level targeting are mainly linked to the occurrence of
ﬁnancial shocks in the economy.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on optimal monetary policy in an environment
with nominal assets. In particular, Mendicino and Pescatori (2005) and Pescatori (2008) highlight the
role of inﬂation and debt-service stabilization for the optimal conduct of monetary policy in models
with nominal debt and price stickiness. Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2008) show that in the presence
of nominal assets and liabilities with different terms-to-maturity, an unexpected one percent increase
in the price level generates consistently higher redistribution and more sizeable effects on aggregate
output under inﬂation targeting than price level targeting. Covas and Zhang (2008) document that,
in a model with nominal debt contracts, the output-inﬂation volatility trade-off criterion suggests that
price-level targeting is generally better than an estimated inﬂation targeting rule for the Canadian
economy. We assess the role of monetary policy in reducing the distortions generated by the presence
of nominal debt contracts in a full-ﬂedged DSGE model.
The paper is also linked to the growing literature on estimated small open economy models.8 In
particular, we relate our ﬁndings to previous estimated small open economy models of the Canadian
economy.9 This paper represents the ﬁrst attempt to quantify the role of ﬁnancial shocks in Canada.
Christiano et al. (2007) provide evidence on the importance of ﬁnancial shocks for macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations in US. Unlike Christiano et al. (2007), we do not limit our attention to domestic ﬁnancial
shocks but we also document the role of international ﬁnancial shocks. One of the novel aspects of
this paper is the empirical assessment of international ﬁnancial spillovers to Canada. According to
the IMF country report (2008), ﬁnancial conditions are by far the largest source of US spillover to
Canada. Over the period 1983-2007, Canadian non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms raised on average one-quarter of
their funds in the US ﬁnancial market. This suggests that changes in the US ﬁnancial conditions can
have substantial implications for economic conditions in Canada.10 Thus, we contribute to this later
literature by highlighting the role of domestic and international ﬁnancial shocks in business cycle
8Among others see Adolfson et al. (2007), Bergin (2003), Ghironi (2000), Lubik and Schorfeide (2003, 2005), Lubic
and Teo (2005), Rabanal and Tuesta (2005, 2008), Del Negro (2003), Curdia and Finocchiaro (2007), Smets and Wouters
(2008), and Lind´ e et al. (2004).
9Among others, see Ambler, Dib and Rebei (2004), Justiniano and Preston (2008) for standard one-sector models;
Ortega and Nooman (2006) for a two-sector model; Dib (2008) for a multi-sector model; and Christensen, Corrigan,
Mendicino and Nishiyama (2008) for a an estimated model with collateralized debt.
10See Swiston and Bayoumi (2008) and Klyuev (2008).
5ﬂuctuations.
3. The Model
In this section we describe the model economy. We consider a small open economy populated by
households, producers of ﬁnal goods for consumption and investment purposes, a continuum of re-
tailers and importers, producers of physical capital, entrepreneurs, a government, and a central bank.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by h 2 [0;1]. Each household h






where E0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at the period 0,
¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, and U(¢) is a utility function, which is assumed to be strictly












The parameter ° is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, and ¿
is the inverse of the Frisch wage elasticity of labour supply. The preference parameters, ° and ¿;
are strictly positive. Households supply specialized labour services to the tradable and non-tradable












HT;ht and HN;ht represent hours worked by the household h in the two sectors.
At time t, households receive total factor payment, WT;htHT;ht + WN;htHN;ht, pay a lump-sum
tax, ¨ht; to the government and receive dividend payments from retailers and importers, ­ht; where
­ht = ­T;ht + ­N;ht + ­F;ht is the total proﬁt from retailers in tradable and non-tradable sectors and
importers. Households deposit funds at the domestic ﬁnancial intermediary, Dht; and trade foreign
6bonds denominated in foreign currency, B¤
ht. The budget constraint of household h is given by:





· WT;htHT;ht + WN;htHN;ht
+ Rt¡1Dht¡1 + etB
¤
ht¡1 + ­ht ¡ ¨ht: (2)
Household h chooses Cht;Dht, and B¤
ht to maximize its lifetime utility, subject to the budget con-
straint. et is the nominal exchange rate. The foreign bond return rate, ·tR¤
t, depends on the foreign
interest rate R¤










where À > 0 is a parameter determining the foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio, Yt is total real GDP and ~ B¤
t
is the total level of indebtedness of the economy. The introduction of this risk premium ensures that
the model has a unique steady state. The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition derived from








We deﬁne the CPI inﬂation rate and the real exchange rate, respectively as ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 and St =
etP ¤
t =Pt where P ¤
t is a foreign price index:
As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), we assume that households are monopolistic suppliers
of differentiated labour services. After setting their wages, they inelastically supply the services to a
competitive “employment agency” that transforms individual labour hours into sectoral labour inputs










;i = T;N; (5)
where LT;t and LN;t denote aggregate labour supplies in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, re-
spectively, and # > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among different types of labour. The
aggregator takes the wage rate Wi;ht for the household h as given and sells the labour input to the

















Households set nominal wages in staggered contracts, where (1 ¡ 'i) is the probability of changing
the nominal wage for the labour services used in sector i = fT;Ng at the beginning of each period
t. See Calvo (1983). We assume full indexation as in Yun (1996). If household h is not allowed
to change its nominal wage, it charges last period’s wage multiplied by the average inﬂation rate,
Wi;ht+1 = ¼Wi;ht, where ¼ > 1. Thus, the nominal wage index in the sector i evolves over time
according to the following recursive equation:
(Wi;t)
1¡# = 'i(¼Wi;t¡1)
1¡# + (1 ¡ 'i)(f Wi;t)
1¡#; (8)
where f Wi;t is the wage of those workers who are allowed to revise their wage at period t in the sector











































5 = 0; (9)
where ³i;t = ¡
@U=@Hi;ht
@U=@Cht is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour type





















where e wi;ht = f Wi;ht=Pt is household h’s real optimized wage in the sector i, while wi;t = Wi;t=Pt is
the real wage index in the sector i.










dh;i = T;N: (11)

















i;t¡1;i = T;N (12)
where ~ wi;t and wi;t are respectively the real optimized wage and average real wages in sector i, while
¼w
i;t is the wage inﬂation rate in sector i.11
3.2 Firms
Final consumption and investment goods are produced by combining tradable, non-tradable and im-
ported goods. Sectoral output is produced by aggregating different brands through the Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator. Branding ﬁrms buy domestic and foreign homogeneous intermediate inputs, differenti-
ate them slightly and then sell the products in a competitive manner. They set prices as in Calvo
(1983). We follow Yun (1996) and assume that ﬁrms that cannot change their price index it to the
average inﬂation rate. Domestic manufacturing ﬁrms produce goods for both domestic use and ex-
port. Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), we assume the producers’ currency pricing behavior in
the manufacturing sector. Thus, the law of one price holds for exported domestic goods. However,
due to the presence of nominal rigidities in the import sector, exchange rate movements are partially
passed through to domestic prices. Capital producers use investment goods to produce new capital
purchased from entrepreneurs. In particular, we assume that entrepreneurs borrow to ﬁnance part of
their acquisitions of capital used in the production processes. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate
tradable and non-tradable goods using labour services and sector-speciﬁc capital.
3.2.1 Consumption and investment goods
There is a representative ﬁrm that acts in a perfectly competitive market and uses sectoral output to
produce ﬁnal consumption and investment goods, Z
j
t, with j = fC;Ig, according to the following



















































F denote the shares of domestically-used tradable, non-tradable, and imported













and ºj > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods. Given the prices PT;t, PN;t, PF;t,


























subject to (13). Proﬁt maximization implies the following demand functions for domestically-used









































Thus, as the relative prices of domestic and imported goods rise, the demand for domestic and im-
ported goods decrease.
The zero-proﬁt condition implies that the ﬁnal-good price level, which is the consumer-priceindex









































There is a continuum of producers of domestic (tradable and non-tradable) and imported brands
z{ 2 [0;1] in each sector { = fN;T;Fg. Branding ﬁrms buy tradable, non-tradable or foreign
homogeneous intermediate inputs, Y {
t ; either from domestic entrepreneurs or foreign producers at
price P {
t in a competitive market. The unit costs for tradable and non-tradable inputs equal their
marginal cost, »i;t, with i = fN;Tg: The unit cost for imported intermediate goods is etP ¤
t for a
10given nominal exchange rate, et, and foreign price level, P ¤
t : Using a linear technology, branding
ﬁrms differentiate the input slightly and transform it into Yt(z{) that they sell at price Pt(z{) in a
monopolistically competitive manner. Intermediate goods of each brand are imperfect substitutes in
the production of the ﬁnal composite sectorial goods. Each brand is aggregated into a ﬁnal good for









: This implies that the price for each








At time t, each branding ﬁrm z{ is allowed to revise its price at time with probability (1 ¡ Á{).























Y{;t+l: The producer’s discount
factor is given by ¯¸t+l; where ¸t+l denotes the marginal utility of consumption in period t+l. When


























t = P {
t =Pt is the unit cost in real terms of the input used to produce the brand-good {,
~ pt(z{) = ~ Pt(z{)=Pt is the real optimized price for the brand-good z{, and p{;t = P{;t=Pt is the
relative price of the ﬁnal good in sector {. We assume full indexation as in Yun (1996). If the
ﬁrm cannot re-set the price, it charges last period’s price multiplied by the average inﬂation rate,






















{;{ = T;N;F: (19)
11As in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006), the losses can be represented by the following law of motion:
s
P











{;t¡1;i = T;N;F; (20)
where ~ p{;t and p{;t are the real optimized price and average real price in sector {, respectively, while
¼{;t is the price inﬂation rate in sector {.12
Retailers in the tradable sector produce goods for domestic use, Y d
T;t, and exports, Y e
T;t, so that
YT;t = Y d
T;t + Y e
T;t. Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), we assume that the producer exhibits
currency pricing behavior in the branding sector. Under this assumption, the ﬁrm { = T sets the
price ~ Pt(z{) for both home and foreign markets. Thus, the law of one price holds and movements of
the exchange rate are completely passed through to export prices.
The aggregate foreign demand function for exports of manufactured goods under the assumption













t is foreign output. The elasticity of demand for domestic manufactured goods among for-
eigners is ¡º, and $ > 0 is a parameter determining the fraction of domestic manufactured-goods
exports in foreign spending. Since the economy is small, exports represent an insigniﬁcant fraction
of foreign expenditures and have a negligible weight in the foreign price index.
3.3 Capital producers
At the end of the period t, capital producers buy investment goods It, at real price pI;t = PI;t=Pt to
produce sector-speciﬁc capital that can be used by entrepreneurs at time t + 1. Following Christiano,
EichenbaumandEvans(2005), weassumethatcapitalproducersinsectori = fT;Ngfaceinvestment










such that in steady state S = S0 = 0 and S00 > 0; and Âi > 0 is an investment adjustment cost
parameter. Due to the adjustment costs, the capital producers face a dynamic problem












where ¸t+k is the marginal utility of consumption in period t + k. The production of each capital
stock yields the following time-t proﬁt function
¦
i
t = qi;tIi;t [¹t ¡ S(Ii;t;Ii;t¡1)] ¡ pI;tIi;t: (24)
The aggregate stock of capital evolves as follows:
Ki;t+1 = Ii;t [¹t ¡ S(Ii;t;Ii;t¡1)] + (1 ¡ ±)Ki;t; (25)
where ¹t is an investment-efﬁciency shock that follows an AR(1) process.
3.4 Entrepreneurs
We assume that entrepreneurs manage ﬁrms that produce wholesale tradable and non-tradable goods
according to the following constant-returns-to-scale technology:
Yi;t · Ai;t (Ki;t)
®i (Li;t)
1¡®i ; (26)
where i = fN;Tg: To produce output Yi;t in sector i, the entrepreneurs use Ki;t units of capital
purchased in t ¡ 1 and Li;t units of labour services and ®i 2 (0;1) is the share of capital in the
production of the sector i. Ai;t is a sector speciﬁc shock that evolves exogenously according to an
AR(1) process.
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that entrepreneurs borrow to ﬁnance part of their invest-
ment in capital used in the production processes. At the end of each period t, entrepreneurs in sector
i purchase capital Ki;t+1 to be used in the next period’s production. The cost of the purchased capital
is qi;tKi;t+1. The acquisition of capital is ﬁnanced partly from their net worth, Xi;t, and the rest by
borrowing from domestic or foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries. Therefore, the level of entrepreneurial
borrowing equals qi;tKi;t+1 ¡ Xi;t:
The entrepreneurs’ demand for capital depends on expected marginal returns, and the expected
external ﬁnancing cost at t+1, Etfi;t+1. Therefore, the entrepreneurs’ capital demand guarantees that
Etfi;t+1 =
zi;t+1 + (1 ¡ ±)qi;t+1
qi;t
; (27)
13where zi;t+1 is the marginal productivity of capital at t+1, ± is the capital depreciation rate, and qi;t is
the real price of capital paid in period t. Intermediaries obtain funds from household deposits and face
an opportunity cost of lending equal to either the domestic or the foreign economy’s nominal riskless
rate of return, Rt; between t and t + 1: Thus, in equilibrium, the marginal external ﬁnancing cost is
equal to a gross premium of external funds plus the gross real opportunity costs. We follow Bernanke
et al. (1999) and assume that the external ﬁnance premium, ªi(¢), depends on the entrepreneur’s
leverage ratio.13
The IMF country report (2008) documents that over the period 1983-2007 Canadian non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms raised on average one-quarter of their funds in the US ﬁnancial market. Accordingly, we assume
that entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow from the international ﬁnancial market. The model allows
for two different sources of external credit ﬁnance but does not aim to explain why different types
of contracts co-exist. For simplicity, we impose that different sectors of the economy (tradable and
non-tradable goods producers) rely on different sources of external ﬁnancing.
We assume that entrepreneurs in the non-tradable sector borrow only from domestic intermedi-









where¡N;t isanAR(1)shocktotheexternalﬁnancingcostinthedomesticcreditmarket, Et (Rt=¼t+1)







13Bernanke et al. (1999) assume the existence of an agency problem that makes external ﬁnance more expensive than
internal funds. The entrepreneur costlessly observes its output, which is subject to a random outcome. In contrast, the
ﬁnancial intermediaries incur an auditing cost to observe the entrepreneurs’ output of production. After observing their
project outcome, entrepreneurs decide whether to repay their debt or to default. If they default, the ﬁnancial intermediaries
audit the loan and recover the project outcome, less monitoring costs. Bernanke et al. (1999) solve a ﬁnancial contract
that maximizes the payoff to the entrepreneur, subject to the required rate of return of lenders. They show that—given
the parameter values associated with the cost of monitoring the borrower, the characteristics of the distribution of en-
trepreneurial returns, and the expected life span of the ﬁrms—the optimal contract implies an external ﬁnance premium,
ªi(¢), that depends on the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio.
14Allowing ﬁrms to be able to choose between different sources of external ﬁnancing would introduce portfolio deci-
sions and require different solution methods.
15For more details, see Bernanke et al. (1999), who derive an optimal contract between entrepreneurs and ﬁnancial
intermediaries under an asymmetric information problem.
14withª0
N(¢) < 0andªN(1) = 1. Shockstotheexternalﬁnancingcostcanbeinterpretedasexogenous
ﬁnancial shocks to credit conditions (supply-side of credit in the economy). They represent shocks to
the intermediation process.16
We assume that entrepreneurs in the tradable sector, T; borrow from foreign intermediaries that
face an opportunity cost of funds equal to R¤
t, the world nominal risk-free return rate between t and
t + 1; adjusted for changes in the real exchange rates. Thus, demand for capital in the tradable sector












where ¡T;t is an AR (1) shock to the external ﬁnancing cost in the international credit market. The








T(¢) < 0 and ªT(1) = 1. Shocks to the external ﬁnancing cost can be interpreted as exogenous
shocks to credit conditions.







where Ãi ¸ 0 represents the external ﬁnance premium elasticity in the sector i = fT;Ng.17
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and have a ﬁnite expected horizon. The probability that an en-
trepreneur will survive until the next period is ³i. Therefore, their expected lifetime is 1=(1 ¡ ³i).
This assumption ensures that entrepreneurial net worth (i.e. ﬁrm equity) will never be enough to
16The ﬁnancial shocks represent exogenous effects and changes in the conﬁdence level of intermediaries with respect
to the risks and the health of the economy. They also approximate perceived changes in creditworthiness.
17The steady-state leverage ratio is 1 ¡ ki, with ki = Xi
qiKi. The external ﬁnance premia depend on the size of the
borrower’s equity stake in a project (or, alternatively, the borrower’s leverage ratio). As
Xi;t
qi;tKi;t decreases, the borrower
relies on uncollateralized borrowing (higher leverage) to a larger extent to fund the project. Since this increases the
incentive to misreport the outcome of the project, the loan becomes riskier and the cost of borrowing rises. When the
riskiness of loans increases, the agency costs rise and the lender’s expected losses increase. A higher external ﬁnance
premium paid by successful entrepreneurs offsets these higher losses and ensures that there is no change to the return on
deposits for households.
15fully ﬁnance net capital acquisitions. Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth in the two sectors evolves
according to
Xi;t = ³ivi;t + (1 ¡ ³i)gi;t; (33)
where vi;t denotes the net worth of surviving entrepreneurs (net of borrowing costs) carried over from
the previous period, 1 ¡ ³i is the share of new entrepreneurs entering the economy, and gi;t is the
transfer or “seed money” that newly entering entrepreneurs receive from entrepreneurs who die and
depart from the scene.18 vi;t is given by
vi;t = [fi;tqi;t¡1Ki;t ¡ Et¡1fi;t(qi;t¡1Ki;t ¡ Xi;t¡1)]; (34)
where fi;t is the ex-post real return on capital held at t, and Et¡1fi;t is the cost of borrowing (the real
interest rate implied by the loan contract signed at time t¡1). Earnings from operations in this period
become next period’s net worth. In our formulation, borrowers sign a debt contract that speciﬁes
a nominal interest rate.19 The loan repayment (in real terms) will then depend on the ex-post real
interest rate. An unanticipated increase (decrease) in inﬂation will reduce (increase) the real cost of
debt repayment and, therefore, will increase (decrease) entrepreneurial net worth which in turn affects
economic activity and welfare.
3.5 Government and monetary policy
To ﬁt the model to Canadian data, we assume that the monetary authority manages the short-term
nominal interest rate, Rt, according to the following Taylor-type monetary policy rule:
b Rt = %R b Rt¡1 + %¼(b ¼t ¡ b e ¼t) + %y\ GDP t + "Rt; (35)
where %R is a smoothing-term parameter, while %¼ and %y are the policy coefﬁcients measuring the
central bank’s responses to deviations of CPI inﬂation, ¼t, from the inﬂation target ~ ¼t and GDPt;
from its steady-state value, respectively. The variables with hat are the log deviations from their
steady-state values. We deﬁne the model’s GDP at constant prices as
GDPt = Zt + pIIt + pTY
e
T;t ¡ SYF;t
18The parameter ³i will affect the persistence of changes in net worth.
19In Bernanke et al. (1999), the contract is speciﬁed in terms of the real interest rate.
16where pI and pT are respectively the steady state prices of investment goods and tradable goods in
real terms and and S is the real exchange rate in steady state.
The monetary policy rule is subject to an uncorrelated and normally distributed monetary pol-
icy shock, "Rt. For empirical plausibility, the model features positive long-run inﬂation. Following
Adolfson et al. (2007), we also allow for deviations of the inﬂation target from a time varying in-
ﬂation targeting, ~ ¼t: We refer to the time-varying inﬂation targeting as an inﬂation target shock that
follows an AR(1) process with mean equal to the average quarterly inﬂation rate in the sample.20
We assume that the government consumes a fraction G of the ﬁnal consumption good and runs a
balanced-budget ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes: PtGt = ¨t, where Gt follows an AR(1) process.
3.6 Rest of the world
We assume Canada to be a small open economy. Thus, domestic developments do not affect the
rest of the world economy. However, the foreign economy’s dynamics have an impact on the Cana-
dian economy. For simplicity we assume that the foreign interest rate, foreign output and the world
inﬂation rate are exogenous and follow AR(1) processes.
3.7 Market clearing conditions
In the symmetric equilibrium, all households, intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms, and importers
make identical decisions. Therefore, Cht = Ct, Dht = Dt, B¤
ht = B¤
t, f Wi;ht = f Wi;t, Hht =
Ht;Hi;ht = Hi;t, Pt(z{) = P{;t, Yt(z{) = Y{;t, Y ¤
t (zT) = Y ¤
t , for all h 2 [0;1], z{ 2 [0;1],
i = fT;Ng and { = fF;T;Ng. Furthermore, the ﬁnal goods market, the loan market, and the bond
market must clear. The ﬁnal good is divided between consumption, Ct; and government spending,
Gt, so that ZC
t = Ct + Gt. The production of investment goods equals the use of investment in the
production of capital goods, ZI
t = IN;t +IT;t: Domestic real output Yt, is simply the sum of output in
both production sectors, so that Yt = YN;t + YT;t.
Combining the household’s budget constraint, government budget, and single-period proﬁt func-
tions of manufactured and non-tradable goods producing ﬁrms, and foreign goods importers yields
a current account equation. The current account equation in real terms, under the producer currency
20The Bank of Canada adopted an explicit inﬂation targeting only since the 1991. The time-varying inﬂation targeting
helps to approximate the conduct of monetary policy in the pre-91 period.



















t is the stock of real foreign debt in the domestic economy.
3.8 Shock Processes
Apart from "Rt, a zero-mean i.i.d. shock with variance ¾R; the other structural shocks follow AR(1)
processes:
ln(xt) = (1 ¡ ½x)ln(x) + ½x ln(xt¡1) + "xt; "xt
iid v N(0;¾"x); 0 < ½x < 1 . (37)
where xt = f¹t;AN;t;AT;t;¡N;t;¡T;t;Gt; ~ ¼t;R¤
t;Y ¤
t ;¼¤
tg, x > 0 is a steady-state value of xt, ½x
is an autoregressive coefﬁcient vector, and "xt is a vector of uncorrelated and normally distributed
innovations with zero means and standard deviations ¾"x:
4. Estimation
4.1 Estimation strategy
We use Bayesian techniques to estimate a vector of structural parameters of the model, ¤, describing
price and wage stickiness, investment adjustment cost, risk premium elasticities, the monetary policy
rule and the shocks. First, for given parameter values we solve the model by using standard ﬁrst-order
approximation techniques. Then, we use the Kalman ﬁlter to compute the likelihood L(¡t j¤) for the
given sample of data ¡t; as in Hamilton (1994). We add some informative priors, '(¤), to downweigh
regions of the parameter space that are widely accepted to be uninteresting. Using Bayes’s rule, the
posterior distribution can be written as the product of the likelihood function of the data given the
parameters, L(¡t j¤), and the prior, '(¤):
P(¤j¡t) n L(¡t j¤)'(¤) (38)
We start by estimating the posterior distribution’s mode by maximizing the log posterior function.
Second, we obtain a random draw of size 150,000 from the posterior distribution using the random-
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The posterior means of the parameters are then used to draw
18statistical inference on the parameters themselves or functions of the parameters, such as second
moments.
4.2 Data, calibration and priors
Data. We estimate the model using eleven series of quarterly Canadian and U.S. data: tradable and
non-tradable outputs, consumption, investment, domestic inﬂation, the domestic nominal interest rate,
real exchange rate, foreign inﬂation, foreign output, and domestic and foreign external ﬁnancing cost.
The desire to have a sample over which the conduct of monetary policy and the statistical properties
of inﬂation have been relatively stable restricts us to use data from 1981:1 to 2007:2.21
The series of tradable output, non-tradable output, consumption, and investment are expressed in
real per capita terms using the Canadian population aged 15 and over. Tradable good production is
measured by output in manufacturing sectors. Non-tradable output is measured by total services.22
Consumption is measured by personal spending on services and non-durable and semi-durable goods.
Investment is measured by private investment. The nominal interest rate is measured by the rate on
Canadian three-month treasury bills. Domestic inﬂation is measured using CPI. The real exchange
rate is measured by multiplying the nominal U.S / CAN exchange rate by the ratio of U.S. to Canadian
prices. Foreign inﬂation is measured by changes in the U.S. GDP implicit price deﬂator. Foreign
output is measured by U.S. real GDP per capita. Finally, domestic and foreign external ﬁnance costs
are measured by Canadian and U.S. business prime lending rates in real terms.
The model implies that all the variables are stationary, ﬂuctuating around constant means. How-
ever, the series described above are non-stationary. Thus, before estimation, the series of tradable,
non-tradable, consumption, investment, foreign output and real exchange rate are logged and linearly
detrended. The series of nominal interest rate, domestic and foreign inﬂation, domestic and foreign
real external ﬁnance costs are demeaned.
Calibration. We calibrate some of the model’s parameters to capture the salient features of the
Canadianeconomy. Inparticular, wecalibratetheparametersforwhich thedatausedintheestimation
contain only limited information. Table 1 reports the calibration values. The discount factor, ¯, is set
to 0.99, which implies an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4 percent which matches the average
21Sectorial data are available since 1981:1.
22Services includes construction, transportation and storage, communications, insurance, ﬁnance and real estate, com-
munity and personal services and utilities
19observed in the estimation sample. The curvature parameter in the utility function, °, is set to 2,
implying an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.5. Following Bouakez et al. (2008), we set
the labour elasticity of substitution across sectors and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of labour, & and ¿; to unity. We assume that households allocate one third of their time to
market activities. As suggested by Macklem et al. (2000), the fractions of labour in the non-tradable
and tradable sectors are 0:64 and 0:36; respectively. To match these fractions, the values of ´T and ´N
equal 7:5 and 4, respectively.
The capital shares in the production of tradable and non-tradable goods, ®T and ®N; are set to 0:35
and 0:3, which are close to the values suggested by Macklem et al. (2000). The capital depreciation
rate, ±, is assumed to be common to both tradable and non-tradable sectors and set to 0:025; a value
commonly used in the literature. The shares of tradable, non-tradable, and imported goods in the
production of consumption good, !C
T , !C
N; and !C
F, equal 0:2, 0:58 and 0:22, respectively, to match
the average ratios observed in the data for the estimation period. Since the share of imported good in




F equal to 0:2, 0:4 and 0:4, respectively.
The parameter measuring the degree of monopoly power in the intermediate-goods markets, µ, is
set to be equal to 6, which implies a 20 percent markup in the steady-state. The parameter #, which
measures the degree of monopoly power in the labour market, is set equal to 8, implying a steady-
state wage markup of 14 percent. Based on Dib (2003), both the elasticity of substitution between
tradable, non-tradable and imported goods in the production of ﬁnal consumption goods, ºC, and
the elasticity of demand for domestic manufactured-goods among foreigners, º, are set equal to 0:8.
The elasticity of substitution between tradable, non-tradable and imported goods in the production of
ﬁnal investment goods, ºI, is set equal to 0:6, implying that imported goods are less substitutable in
producing investment than against the consumption good production .
The parameter À is calibrated to match a foreign-debt-to-GDP of about 10 percent as in the data.
Following King and Santor (2008), the parameters determining the steady-state leverage ratios for
tradable and non-tradable sectors, kT and kN, are set to 0.7 and 0.6, respectively. The steady-state
gross domestic and foreign inﬂation rates, ¼ and ¼¤, equal 1:0089 and 1:0088, respectively, which are
the historical averages over the estimation sample for Canada and the U.S.
Prior Distribution. Bayesian estimation allows us to formally use informative priors on the
probability distributions of the model’s parameters. The priors are based on earlier macro and micro
evidence. Table 2 reports the prior distributions assumed for the estimated parameters. We use Beta
20distributions for all parameters bounded in the [0,1] range. This applies to the shocks’ autoregressive
coefﬁcient, whose mean we set to 0.6. The parameters of nominal stickiness are also assumed to
follow a beta distribution with mean 0.67, which corresponds to changing prices and wages every 3
quarters on average. Gamma and Inverted Gamma distributions are assumed for parameters that are
supposed to be positive. Our priors on the investment adjustment cost and risk-premium elasticity
are in line with previous literature.23 For the standard deviation of the shocks we assume an Inverted
Gamma distribution with mean 0.5 percent and standard deviation 2. We follow previous literature
also in setting the priors on the monetary policy parameters. The prior assumptions on the monetary
policy parameters allow for a range of interest-rate inertia between 0 and 1, and a positive response
to inﬂation. We use a normal distribution for the reaction to output in order to allow for a negative
response.
4.3 Estimation Results
Parameter Estimates. Table 2 reports the results for the estimated parameters and shock processes
of the model. The estimated monetary policy rule features a positive reaction to the lagged interest
rate, a moderate response to inﬂation, and a positive but small response to output. These ﬁndings are
in line with previous estimates for the Canadian economy.24
The estimates of the elasticities of the external ﬁnance premium, ÃN and ÃT, are 0.028 and 0.033
at the posterior mean. This implies a higher degree of credit frictions in the international credit market
than in the domestic market. The investment adjustment cost parameters, ÂN and ÂT, are estimated
at 0.45 and 0.54. Thus, it is slightly more costly to adjust investment in the tradable sector.
The estimated values of the nominal price and wage stickiness parameters, ÁT; ÁN; ÁF; 'T, and
'N, indicate sectoral heterogeneity. Therefore, our prior assumption of the same degree of stickiness
on average across sectors doesn’t hold. Due to the presence of wage stickiness the estimates of
the price rigidity parameters are smaller in the tradable and non-tradable sectors than in the import
sector.25
Technology, government and investment speciﬁc shocks appear to be moderately persistent in the
model. However, the estimates of the standard deviations of the shocks suggest that these shocks are
23See, among others, Christensen and Dib (2008), Elekdagn, Justiniano and Tchakarov (2006), Mendicino and Pesca-
tori(2005), Queijo von Heideken (2007), Smets and Wouters (2007).
24See, among others, Ortega and Rebei (2006) and Dib (2008).
25Estimates in which the presence of wage stickiness reduces the role of price stickiness can be found, among others,
in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Dib (2006).
21quite volatile. On the other hand, ﬁnancial shocks exhibit a higher degree of persistence but much
lower volatility. The autocorrelation coefﬁcients of the domestic and international ﬁnancial shocks
are both estimated at 0.98, while the estimated standard deviations of these shocks at the posterior
means are around 0.16 and 0.13 percent, respectively.
Sources of Business Cycle Fluctuations in Canada. Since Sims (1980) and Kydland and
Prescott (1982), understanding the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations has been a major issue in
macroeconomics. According to the conventional view in the real business cycle literature, technology
shocks are identiﬁed as the main source of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. In contrast, the SVAR evi-
dence and DSGE models with a richer stochastic structure tend to conclude that other types of distur-
bances are more relevant in generating business cycles. In particular, investment speciﬁc shocks tend
to play a bigger role than neutral technology shocks.26 Table 3 shows the contribution of each shock
to the variability of the model’s variables. As a result, ﬁnancial and investment speciﬁc shocks appear
to be the main sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations for the Canadian economy. Financial shocks to
the international and domestic markets explain about 35 and 55 percent of the variability in tradable
and non-tradable output, respectively. In particular, ﬁnancial shocks to the domestic market explain
36 percent of investment and 45 percent of the price of investment variability, 32 percent of variation
in the real exchange rate, 31 percent of variation in GDP, 25 percent of ﬂuctuations in hours, and 22
percent of the variation in consumption. On the other hand, international ﬁnancial shocks account for
11 percent of variations in GDP, 12 percent of investment and real exchange rate variability, 8 percent
of consumption’s ﬂuctuations, and 7 percent of variation in asset prices.27 Investment-speciﬁc shocks
explain only 18 percent of variations in investment but account for most of the variations in asset
prices and for 40 percent of the variability in the external ﬁnancing cost. Investment-speciﬁc shocks
also contribute to 15 percent of ﬂuctuations in hours worked, 9 percent in GDP, and 10 percent in
consumption.
Monetary policy shocks and inﬂation-targeting shocks explain most of the variability in inﬂation
and nominal interest rate. They also contribute to the volatility of the external ﬁnancing cost in
both sectors by about 25 percent. Foreign interest rate shocks account for 66 percent of ﬂuctuations
in foreign debt. They also explain about 20 percent of the variations in investment and the real
26See Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000), Fisher (2006), Canova, Lopez-Salido and Michelacci (2006), and
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tanbalotti (2008).
27Our results are in line with Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) that document the signiﬁcant role of ﬁnancial
shocks for business cycle ﬂuctuations in the US. No previous work on the role of ﬁnancial shocks has been done using
Canadian data.
22exchange rate, 12 percent of the variation in tradable output, and 17 percent of the variability in the
external ﬁnance premium in the domestic sector.28 Technology shocks are among the main sources
of variability in production. Shocks to the production of non-tradable goods explain 22 percent of
consumption’s ﬂuctuations and only 5 percent of the ﬂuctuations in hours worked.
Tables 4.a-4.b report the model’s business cycle statistical properties at the posterior mean of the
parameters. The model’s correlations are closely related to the correlations displayed in the data. In
particular, the model accounts for the correlation between the nominal interest rate and inﬂation as in
the data. However, the correlation between tradable and non-tradable production, and between non-
tradable production and investment are slightly lower than in the data. The model implies slightly
higher correlation between the external ﬁnancing cost in the domestic and international markets, and
the tradable production and the real exchange rate. Overall, the model’s ﬁt in terms of correlations
is in line with the data. In terms of autocorrelations, the model implies higher inﬂation persistence
than in the data. Nevertheless, the autocorrelations of sectoral production, the real exchange rate and
nominal interest rate are close to those in the data.
5. Price-Level Targeting and Welfare
In the following, we analyze optimal monetary policy rules in the estimated model presented in the
previoussections. Tomaximizewelfare, optimalmonetarypolicyshouldreducethecostofdistortions
present in the model. Nominal price and wage stickiness implies that a strong anti-inﬂationary stance
could increase economic activity and welfare by reducing the cost of price and wages dispersions.29
The presence of debt contracts in nominal terms generates uncertainty about the repayment of the debt
and thus unexpected redistribution of wealth between borrowers and lenders. Since entrepreneurs
borrow from households to ﬁnance part of their capital expenditure, variations in the price level,
which generates distortions in the allocation of resources, affect economic activity, consumption and
hours worked. Stabilizing the debt-services through the stabilization of the real interest rate would
minimize the allocative distortions generated by the debt-deﬂation channel and improve welfare.30
28As showed by Justiniano and Preston (2006) medium-scale DSGE small open economy models fail in explaining the
synchronization of international business cycle ﬂuctuations. According to their ﬁndings, foreign shocks usually play little
role in domestic business cycle independently of the priors and the structure of the model.
29See among others Woodford (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006).
30The distortion generated by nominal debt contracts has been less explored by the literature. See Mendicino and
Pescatori (2005) for the implications of nominal debt contracts for optimal monetary policy in a model with collateralized
235.1 Computation and Welfare Measure
We rely on utility-based welfare calculations, assuming that the benevolent monetary authority max-
imizes the utility of households, subject to the model’s equilibrium conditions. We deﬁne V ¤
0 as the

















t denote the contingent plans of consumption and labour, respectively, under the
optimal policy regime.
Since the rules considered in the paper do not have any ﬁrst-order effect, the deterministic steady
state of the model is the same across the two regimes. Nevertheless, different policy regimes are
associated with different stochastic steady states. So, in order not to neglect welfare effects occurring
during the transition from one steady state to another, we evaluate welfare conditional on the initial
state being the non stochastic steady state.31
We limit our attention to simple, optimal, operational interest rate rules that determine the interest
rate as a function of the lagged interest rate, GDP and either CPI inﬂation or the price level. In
particular, we consider the welfare performance of optimized rules such as the inﬂation targeting rule
as in (33) and the following price-level targeting rule:
b Rt = %R b Rt¡1 + %P(b Pt ¡ b e P t) + %y\ GDP t + "Rt; (39)
where Pt = ¼tPt¡1 and e Pt = e ¼t e Pt¡1 respectively are the level and its target.
We evaluate optimal monetary policy rules by implementing second-order approximation tech-
niques. As shown by previous literature, ﬁrst-order approximation methods are not locally accurate
to evaluate the performance of different policies in terms of welfare.32
household debt.
31See, among others, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006).
32For instance, Kim and Kim (2003) show that a welfare comparison based on the linear approximation of the policy
functions of a simple two-country economy, may yield the odd result of welfare being greater under autarky than under a
condition of full risk sharing.
245.2 Optimal Simple Interest-Rate Rules
5.2.1 Price Level Targeting
In what follows, we investigate the optimal design of price-level targeting rules as in (39) and assess
the welfare gains compared against the historical rule. Table 5 reports the main ﬁndings. We rank
the rules according to the implied welfare cost of business cycle ﬂuctuations in terms of steady state
consumption. We consider two constrained optimal interest rate rules. The ﬁrst is a non-smoothing
rule. We search over the policy parameters %P and %y keeping %R to zero.33 The smoothing rule
allows for interest-rate inertia by setting %R equal to its estimated value – i.e. 0.8138. We compare
the optimized simple rules to three ad hoc rules and the estimated rule. The optimized constrained
rules feature an aggressive reaction to the price level and a positive response to deviations of output
from the steady state. The welfare gains of allowing for interest rate smoothing are not signiﬁcant.
Our results suggest that responding to output does not deliver signiﬁcant welfare gains. Instead, a
stronger reaction to variation in the price level reduces welfare. With respect to the estimated rule, the
optimal price-level targeting rule delivers signiﬁcant welfare gains in terms of steady state consump-
tion. Using 2006 ﬁgures for personal consumption expenditure per person in Canada, the welfare
cost of business cycle ﬂuctuations would be $245 and $162 per year respectively under the estimated
inﬂation targeting rule and optimal price level targeting rule. So, under the estimated interest rate
smoothing, the cost per capita of adopting the estimated inﬂation targeting rule instead of the optimal
price-level targeting rule is about $83 per year.
To understand the sources of welfare gains by adopting the price-level targeting regime we need
to analyze the effectiveness of the optimal rule in minimizing the distortions featured by the model.
Price and wage dispersions are costly distortions. The resource costs induced by the inefﬁcient price
and wage dispersions featured by Calvo’s mechanism in the tradable, non-tradable and import prices,









N;t. See Table 6.a for the stochastic mean of these costs under the optimal and estimated rule.
The optimal price-level targeting rule, reducing the volatility of inﬂation, lowers the cost of price
and wage dispersions in all the sectors. Table 6.b. shows that an optimal response to the price-level
also stabilizes the economy. In fact, the optimal price-level targeting rule delivers lower variability
of the inﬂation rate as well as the real and nominal interest rate. In the table, Rr represents the real
interest rate. In the presence of nominal debt, agents face uncertainty regarding the repayment of the
33We search over a [0,20] range for both %P and %y.
25debt. Thus the stabilization of the real interest rate reduces the risk embedded in the nominal contract
and increases welfare. Through the stabilization of the returns on nominal assets and liabilities, the
optimal price-level targeting rule reduces the volatility of hours worked and thus, output and delivers
higher long-run consumption and output.
The optimal price-level targeting rule performs better than the estimated rule in terms of social
welfare since it delivers lower variability of the real interest rate which helps reduce the nominal debt
distortions and signiﬁcantly reduces the cost of price and wage dispersions.
5.2.2 Inﬂation Targeting vs Price-Level Targeting Rules
In order to assess the beneﬁts of price-level targeting, we compare the performance of the optimal
price level targeting rule with the optimal inﬂation targeting rule.34 As reported in Table 7, the inﬂa-
tion coefﬁcient of the optimized non-inertial inﬂation targeting rule takes the largest possible value
in the grid. Removing the upper bound on the inﬂation response parameter would imply a much
larger response to inﬂation but would yield negligible improvements in terms of welfare. Introduc-
ing interest-rate smoothing improves welfare. The smoothing rule features an aggressive reaction to
inﬂation and little response to output deviations from their steady-state values. However, a strict anti-
inﬂationary stance is not welfare-improving. Compared to the estimated rule, the optimal smoothing
inﬂation targeting rule generates welfare gains in terms of steady state consumption that can be sum-
marized in about $72 per person per year.
According to previous literature, price-level targeting rules perform generally better than optimal
Taylor rules due to the introduction of history dependence in monetary policy. History dependence is
such that the expectations of future deﬂation (inﬂation) immediately depress (spur) inﬂation when the
shock hits the economy. Thus, introducing history dependence in a forward-looking model stabilizes
expectations and delivers lower macroeconomic variability and higher welfare. In order to test the
desirability of history dependence for monetary policy introduced by the price-level targeting regime,
we ﬁrst compare the optimal non-inertial rules. See Table 8.a. Price level targeting performs better
than the inﬂation-targeting rule by about 7.4 percent in terms of welfare, which is about $17.5 per
person per year.
Interest-rate smoothing is an alternative source of history dependency. Thus, adding a response
to the lagged interest rate would help the inﬂation targeting rule approximate a non-smoothing price-
level targeting rule. We investigate the beneﬁts of price-level targeting under the estimated interest-
34The maximization adopt a [0,20] range for all the optimized parameters.
26rate smoothing behavior. As displayed in Table 8.b, allowing for interest-rate smoothing improves
the performance of the inﬂation targeting rule but affects only marginally the performance of the
price-level targeting rule.35
Tables 9.a and 9.b show that price-level targeting slightly reduces the cost of price and wage dis-
persions and implies lower variability of the nominal and real interest rate along with hours worked
and output. The intuition for why price-level targeting performs better than inﬂation targeting is as
follows. As emphasized previously, a nearly constant real interest rate would reduce the private risk
generated by the nature of the debt contract. Under an inﬂation targeting rule, the minimization of
variations in the real interest rate would require a unit response of the policy interest rate to inﬂa-
tion. However, this would lead to higher volatility of inﬂation and fail in minimizing the distortions
generated by the presence of price rigidities. Therefore, there arises a trade-off between the nomi-
nal debt distortion and the inefﬁciency generated by nominal price stickiness.36 Under the optimal
inﬂation-targeting rule, it is not possible to further reduce the uncertainty in the return of the nomi-
nal assets without increasing the cost of price dispersion. Compared to the optimal inﬂation targeting
rule, a price-level targeting rule can reduce the volatility of the real interest rate without increasing the
volatility of inﬂation. Due to the expectation channel triggered by price-level targeting, to generate
the same volatility of inﬂation it requires a lower response to the target in the price-level targeting rule
than in the inﬂation-targeting rule. See column three and four of Table 9.b. As a result, the optimal
price-level targeting rule results in a less volatile nominal interest rate that further lowers the volatility
of the real interest rate. Thus, the optimal price-level targeting rule performs at least as well as the
optimal inﬂation targeting rule in terms of the inefﬁciency linked to price stickiness, but it is more
successful in minimizing the distortions generated by the presence of debt in nominal terms.
5.2.3 Financial Shocks and Monetary Policy
In the previous section we show that the optimal price level targeting rule outperforms the optimal
inﬂation targeting rule mainly due to its ability to minimize the distortion generated by the presence
35In this paper, we limit our attention to simple and implementable interest-rate rules and consider only responses to the
lagged interest rate that are less than unity. The maximization over the lagged interest rate leads to optimal super-inertial
rules, i.e. a response to the lagged interest rate larger than unity. The optimal inﬂation targeting rule would require a much
more aggressive interest rate smoothing than the optimal price-level targeting rule. However for both rules the optimal
response to the lagged interest rate is greater than unity. See, among others, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford
(2003) and Giannoni (2000) for the optimality of super-inertial rules .
36See Mendicino and Pescatori (2005) for further discussion of the trade-off.
27of nominal debt in the credit market. Financial shocks, affecting the cost of external ﬁnance, are
an important source of ﬂuctuations in the borrowing ability of ﬁrms and thus, in the redistribution
of resources between borrowers and lenders. In the following section, we analyze the role of these
shocks for the optimal design of monetary policy.
In Section 4.3, we documented the prominent role of ﬁnancial shocks for macroeconomic ﬂuctu-
ations. The two shocks explain around 30 percent of consumption variations. According to Table 10,
the impact of ﬁnancial shocks is also relevant for welfare.
Table 11.a compares the performance of the optimal inﬂation targeting with the optimal price-
level targeting rule under three cases: all the shocks (benchmark case), no ﬁnancial shocks and only
ﬁnancial shocks. Table 11.b reports the implications of the two alternative regimes when ﬁnancial
shocks are the only source of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Signiﬁcantly lower volatility of inﬂation is
displayed under price level targeting. In the absence of ﬁnancial shocks, the gains from price-level
targeting are signiﬁcantly reduced. The gains from price-level targeting in the benchmark model
economy are mainly linked to the occurrence of ﬁnancial shocks. In fact, ﬁnancial shocks account
for 40 percent of the gains from adopting the optimal price level targeting rule compared against the
optimal inﬂation targeting rule.
6. Uncertainty and Monetary Policy
Some authors have argued that the gains from a price-level targeting regime are particularly relevant
under uncertainty. For completeness, we now study the effects of individual parameter uncertainty
in our model. In particular, Aoki and Nikolov (2005) and Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2005) docu-
mented the gains of price-level targeting in the presence of uncertainty in New Keynesian models.37
Parameters’ Uncertainty. In contrast to previous papers, we do not analyze the effects of un-
certainty in relation to an ad-hoc policy function. Instead, we base our analysis on the model’s en-
dogenous welfare measure. Following the approach proposed by Justiniano and Preston (2008), we
assume that the policymaker adopts either the estimated rule or the optimal price-level or inﬂation
targeting rule and assess the welfare changes implied by variations of single parameters over the 95
percent probability interval of the posterior distribution. We assume that the monetary authority faces
uncertainty about a speciﬁc parameter but knows with certainty the other parameters. Thus, we inves-
tigate how getting a particular parameter wrong affects the comparison between price-level targeting
37See also Cateau (2008) for an application to the projection model used by the Bank of Canada.
28and inﬂation targeting. Table 12 reports the welfare implications of uncertainty about the degree of
price and wage stickiness, investment adjustment costs, and ﬁnancial frictions in the different sectors.
Welfare exhibits little sensitivity to the parameters considered. Relatively larger variations are implied
by uncertainty in the Calvo price parameter in imported goods. Higher Calvo parameter means lower
probability of changing prices and thus higher costs of price dispersion. Welfare is invariant to the
investment adjustment cost. Also, uncertainty about the elasticity of the risk premium doesn’t have
large impact on welfare.
Shocks and Monetary Policy. In what follows, we document the role of the stationarity of the
price level for welfare in the presence of uncertainty related to the shocks hitting the economy. Price-
level targeting performs signiﬁcantly better than the estimated rule since it implies higher welfare
level and lower variability in the presence of uncertainty about the persistence and standard deviation
of the shocks. See Table 13.a. In particular, the variability of welfare under the optimal price-level
targeting is 0.9 percent while under the estimated rule is 1.27 percent. The largest difference observed
in the presence of uncertainty is about the volatility of the shocks.
In comparison with the optimal inﬂation targeting rule, price level targeting delivers welfare gains
of around 6 and 7 percent when the shocks are, respectively, less or more persistent than expected.
The difference in the variability in welfare is not quantitatively important. (See Table 13.b.) The same
result holds when we allow for uncertainty about the variance of the shocks or both the persistence and
variance of the shocks. The gains of price-level targeting with shock uncertainty are around 6 percent
in terms of welfare but only 0.06 percent in terms of welfare variability. Thus, under uncertainty,
the magnitude of the welfare gains delivered by targeting the price level rather than inﬂation level is
unchanged and the beneﬁts related to the variability of welfare are not quantitatively important.
7. Concluding Remarks
The desirability of adopting a price level targeting regime has become a relevant topic among central
bankers. In particular, the Bank of Canada is seriously assessing the desirability of a price-level
path targeting in view of the renewal of its agreement on the monetary policy framework with the
Government of Canada in 2011.
In this paper we assess the beneﬁts of price level targeting rules in an estimated model of the
Canadian economy. Compared to the estimated rule, an optimal price level targeting regime reduces
the welfare cost of business cycle ﬂuctuations in terms of steady state consumption. Price-level tar-
29geting performs better than the estimated rule since it delivers lower variability of the real interest rate
and signiﬁcantly reduces the cost of price and wage dispersions. In the presence of uncertainty the
beneﬁts of adopting a price-level targeting regime are summarized by a lower variability in welfare.
In particular, stabilizing price level is important for welfare when shocks are both more persistent and
volatile than expected.
We also ﬁnd some welfare gains from adopting an optimal price-level targeting instead of an
optimal inﬂation targeting rule. The gains are mainly related to the ability of the optimal price level
targeting rule to minimize the uncertainty generated by nominal debt contracts in the credit market.
The occurrence of ﬁnancial shocks signiﬁcantly contributes to quantify the welfare gains of price
level targeting.
We also document that the presence of parameters’ uncertainty does not signiﬁcantly affect the
performance of the two rules. In fact, the beneﬁts related to the decrease in the variability of welfare
under price level targeting, are not quantitatively important.
Investigating the effects of low uncertainty in the price level for ﬁnancial planning, and in particu-
lar, in the presence of long-term debt contracts is beyond the scope of this paper. Modeling long-term
contracts in macroeconomics is a major challenge and requires separate consideration. The analysis
of the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of long-term debt contract is thus, left to future
research.
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37Table 1: Calibration of the Parameters
Param. Deﬁnition Values
¯ discount factor 0.99
° inverse of intertemporal substitution of consumption 2
& labour elasticity of substitution across sectors 1
¿ inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
ºC elasticity of substitution between sectors in consumption 0.8
ºI elasticity of substitution between sectors in investment 0.6
º elasticity of demand for domestic manufactured goods 0.8
µ intermediate good elasticity of substitution 6
# labour elasticity of substitution 8
®T capital share in tradable goods production 0.35
®N capital share in non-tradable goods production 0.30
±T capital depreciation rate in tradable sector 0.025
±N capital depreciation rate in non-tradable sector 0.025
!C
T share of tradable good in consumption 0.20
!C
N share of non-tradable good in consumption 0.58
!C
F share of imported good in consumption 0.22
!I
T share of tradable good in investment 0.20
!I
N share of non-tradable good in investment 0.40
!I
F share of imported good in investment 0.40
À parameter of country-speciﬁc risk premium 0.03
kT steady-state ratio of net worth to capital in tradable sector 0.7
kN steady-state ratio of net worth to capital in non-tradable sector 0.6
³T survival probability in tradable sector 0.985
³N survival probability in tradable sector 0.987
HT fraction of labour in tradable sector 0.12
HN fraction of labour in non-tradable sector 0.21
¼ gross steady-state domestic inﬂation rate 1.0089
¼¤ gross steady-state foreign inﬂation rate 1.0088
38Table 2.a: Estimation Results
Prior Posterior
Coef. Description Density Mean Std. Mean [5 , 95 ]
ÂT Investment adjustment cost G 4.00 1.00 0.54 0.45 0.65
parameter, tradable sector
ÂN Investment adjustment cost G 4.00 1.00 0.450 0.448 0.453
parameter, non-tradable sector
ÃT Risk premium elasticity, G 0.07 0.025 0.033 0.023 0.042
tradable sector
ÃN Risk premium elasticity, G 0.07 0.025 0.028 0.019 0.037
non-tradable sector
ÁT Calvo price parameter, B 0.67 0.05 0.66 0.59 0.74
tradable sector
ÁN Calvo price parameter, B 0.67 0.05 0.49 0.42 0.55
non-tradable sector
ÁF Calvo price parameter, B 0.67 0.05 0.72 0.65 0.79
import sector
'T Calvo wage parameter, B 0.67 0.05 0.63 0.55 0.72
tradable sector
'N Calvo wage parameter, B 0.67 0.05 0.56 0.48 0.65
non-tradable sector
%R Taylor rule smoothing B 0.60 0.20 0.81 0.71 0.92
%¼ Taylor rule inﬂation G 0.50 0.30 0.47 0.36 0.58
%y Taylor rule output N 0.125 0.10 0.028 0.008 0.046
39Table 2.a: Estimation Results (Continued)
Prior Posterior
Coef. Description Density Mean Std Mean [5 , 95 ]
½AT Technology, B 0.60 0.20 0.95 0.92 0.98
tradable sector
½AN Technology, B 0.60 0.20 0.92 0.88 0.97
non-tradable sector
½G Government spending B 0.60 0.20 0.91 0.88 0.94
½¹ Investment-speciﬁc B 0.60 0.20 0.90 0.88 0.93
½¡T Financial, B 0.60 0.20 0.98 0.97 0.99
tradable sector
½¡N Financial, B 0.60 0.20 0.98 0.97 0.99
non-tradable sector
¾AT Technology, I 0.50 2.00 1.23 1.05 1.39
tradable sector
¾AN Technology, I 0.50 2.00 0.92 0.71 1.13
non-tradable sector
¾G Government spending I 0.50 2.00 3.49 2.84 4.12
¾R Monetary policy I 0.50 2.00 0.30 0.25 0.35
¾¹ Investment-speciﬁc I 0.50 2.00 1.68 1.42 1.92
¾¡T Financial, I 0.50 2.00 0.13 0.11 0.16
tradable sector
¾¡N Financial, I 0.50 2.00 0.16 0.13 0.19
non-tradable sector
¾~ ¼ Inﬂation target I 0.50 2.00 0.16 0.10 0.22
Log likelihood at mean -2511.33
40Table 2.b: Estimation Results (Foreign Shocks’ Block)
Prior Posterior
Coef. Description Density Mean Std Mean [5 , 95 ]
½R¤ Foreign interest rate B 0.80 0.10 0.97 0.94 0.99
½¼¤ Foreign inﬂation B 0.80 0.10 0.83 0.74 0.93
½y¤ Foreign output B 0.80 0.10 0.93 0.90 0.97
¾R¤ Foreign interest rate I 0.50 1.00 0.18 0.16 0.20
¾¼¤ Foreign inﬂation I 0.50 1.00 0.66 0.59 0.74
¾Y ¤ Foreign output I 0.50 1.00 0.25 0.22 0.28










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table 4.a Correlations Table 4.b Autocorrelations
Data Model Data Model
YN;t;YT;t 0.46 0.31 YT;t 0.95 0.98
YN;t;It 0.79 0.64 YN;t 0.98 0.97
YT;t;It 0.64 0.37 ¼t 0.64 0.88
YT;t;St 0.47 0.56 Rt 0.97 0.97
fT;fN 0.65 0.75 St 0.98 0.95
Rt;¼t 0.72 0.73
Table 5: Optimal Price-Level Targeting Rule
b Rt = %R b Rt¡1 + %P(b Pt ¡ b e P t) + %y\ GDP t + "Rt Welfare Welfare costs
Optimal, %R=0 %P=5, %y=3 -2.2804 0.702
Optimal, %R=0.8138 %P=2.5, %y=1.5 -2.2803 0.700
Ad hoc, %R=0.8138 %P=2.5, %y=0 -2.2803 0.701
%P=3, %y=1.5 -2.2804 0.708
%P=20, %y=0.5 -2.2815 0.781
Estimated %R=0.8138, %¼=0.472, %y=0.028 -2.2858 1.058
Welfare cost in terms of consumption as percentage of the steady state consumption level














For any variable, x, ¹(x) represents the stochastic mean










¾(Y ) 2.83 3.04




Stochastic means (¹(x)), and standard deviations (¾(x))
as percentage.
45Table 7. Optimal Inﬂation-Targeting Rule
b Rt = %R b Rt¡1 + %¼b ¼t + %y\ GDP t + "Rt Welfare Welfare costs
Optimal, %R=0 %¼=20, %y=1.5 ¡2:2814 0:776
Optimal, %R=0.8138 %¼=6.5, %y=0.5 ¡2:2810 0:749
Ad-hoc, %R=0.8138 %¼=6.5, %y=0 ¡2:2814 0:772
%R=0 %¼=6.5, %y =0.5 ¡2:2819 0:804
Inﬂation Stabilization ¡2:2820 0:811
Estimated %R=0.8138, %¼=0.472 , %y=0.028 ¡2:2858 1:058
Welfare cost in terms of consumption as percentage of the steady state consumption level
Table 8.a: Price-Level Targeting vs. Inﬂation Targeting
IT PT
Optimal %R=0 %¼=20, %y=1.5 %P=5, %y=3
Welfare level -2.2815 -2.2804
Welfare cost 0.776 0.702
PT vs IT: 0.074 ' 17.5$
Welfare cost in terms of the steady state consumption as percentage.
Table 8.b: Price-Level Targeting vs. Inﬂation Targeting
IT PT
Optimal %R=0.8138 %¼=6.5, %y=0.5 %P=2.5, %y=1.5
Welfare level -2.2810 -2.2803
Welfare cost 0.749 0.700
PT vs IT: 0.049 ' 11.4$
Welfare cost in terms of the steady state consumption as percentage.
46Table 9.a: Cost of Price Dispersion: IT vs PT
%R = 0 %R = 0:8138
IT PT IT PT Est. IT
%¼=20, %y=1.5 %P=5, %y=3 %¼=6.5, %y=0.5 %P=2.5, %y=1.5 %¼=0.472, %y=0.028
¹(s
p
T) 1.0018 1.0019 1.0019 1.0019 1.0034
¹(s
p
N) 1.0004 1.0005 1.0004 1.0005 1.0010
¹(s
p
F) 1.0028 1.0026 1.0029 1.0026 1.0056
¹(sw
T) 1.0018 1.0016 1.0017 1.0016 1.0035
¹(sw
N) 1.0009 1.0009 1.0009 1.0009 1.0020
¹(x) are Stochastic means, while ¾(x) are standard deviations as percentage.
Table 9.b. Level Effect and Stabilization Effect: IT vs PT
%R = 0 %R = 0:8138
IT PT IT PT Est. IT
%¼=20, %y=1.5 %P=5, %y=3 %¼=6.5, %y=0.5 %P=2.5, %y=1.5 %¼=0.472, %y=0.028
¾(C) 1.74 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
¹(C) 0.6610 0.6612 0.6610 0.6612 0.6595
¾(H) 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6
¹(H) 0.5355 0.5353 0.5355 0.5353 0.5361
¾(Rr) 0.74 0.53 0.60 0.49 0.57
¹(Rr) 1.0091 1.0091 1.0091 1.0091 1.0091
¾(¼) 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.80 1.26
¹(¼) 1.0090 1.0089 1.0090 1.0089 1.0091
¾(Y ) 3.09 2.83 3.05 2.83 3.04
¹(Y ) 1.0850 1.0852 1.0851 1.0853 1.0833
¾(R) 1.04 0.89 0.95 0.86 1.16
¹(R) 1.0181 1.0181 1.0181 1.0181 1.0183
¾(S) 3.76 3.50 3.71 3.49 3.77
¹(S) 0.4952 0.4951 0.4954 0.4950 0.4944
¾(P) – 1.91 – 1.93 –
¹(P) – 1.0002 – 1.0002 –
¹(x) are Stochastic means, while ¾(x) are standard deviations as percentage.
Table 10: Welfare and Shocks: Estimated Rule




2.71 12.82 0.59 0.38 10.02 21.70 5.71 29.58 8.04 0.04 8.41
47Table 11.a: PT vs IT and Financial Shocks
Welfare cost % of C Welfare cost % of C Welfare cost %C
All shocks No ﬁn. shocks Only ﬁn. shocks
IT 0.749 0.516 0.233
PT 0.700 0.486 0.214
PT vs IT ' 11:4$ ' 7$ ' 4:4$
Welfare cost in terms of steady state consumption as percentage
Table 11.b: Stabilization Effect PT vs IT: Financial Shocks
¾(C) ¾(H) ¾(Rr) ¾(¼) ¾(R) ¾(Y ) ¹(C) ¹(H)
IT 0.96 0.89 0.25 0.18 0.17 1.87 0.6627 0.5340
PT 0.96 0.81 0.24 0.13 0.26 1.81 0.6628 0.5340
¹(x) are Stochastic means, while ¾(x) are standard deviations as percentage.
Table 12: Uncertainty of Parameters
PT IT Est. IT rule
'T 0.064 0.072 0.072
'N 0.023 0.024 0.090
ÂT 0.0005 0.0005 0.002
ÂN 0.0003 0.00007 0.00008
ÁT 0.037 0.041 0.066
ÁN 0.016 0.008 0.044
ÁF 0.107 0.129 0.246
ÃT 0.011 0.014 0.029
ÃN 0.034 0.042 0.086
%R = 0:8138
Percentage change in welfare due to variation
in the parameter in the 5 and 95 probability
interval.
48Table 13.a: Uncertainty and Welfare: Shocks’ Persistence and Standard Deviations
5% Welfare cost Mean Welfare cost 95% Welfare. cost Sd.(vf)
IT -2.2747 0.332 -2.2810 0.749 -2.2966 1.75 0.96%
PT -2.2744 0.312 -2.2803 0.700 -2.2948 1.64 0.90%
Est: -2.2767 0.464 -2.2858 1.058 -2.3057 2.33 1.27%
Welfare level at the mean and 5 and 95 posterior probability, welfare cost in terms of
consumption as percentage of the steady state consumption level; in brackets the welfare
gains under the optimal price-level targeting w.r.t. the optimal inﬂation targeting;
Sd(vf) represent the variability of welfare under uncertainty.
Table 13.b: Uncertainty and Welfare: Shocks’ Persistence
5% Welfare cost Mean Welfare cost 95% Welfare cost Sd(vf)
IT -2.2783 0.568 -2.2810 0.749 -2.2879 1.19 0.42%
PT -2.2777 0.529 -2.2803 0.700 -2.2867 1.12 0.39%
Est: -2.2830 0.876 -2.2858 1.058 -2.2929 1.52 0.43%
Welfare level at the mean and 5 and 95 posterior probability, welfare cost in terms of
consumption as percentage of the steady state consumption level; in brackets the welfare
gains under the optimal price-level targeting w.r.t. the optimal inﬂation targeting;
Sd(vf) represent the variability of welfare under uncertainty.
Table 13.c: Uncertainty and Welfare: Shocks’ Standard Deviations
5% Welfare cost Mean Welfare cost 95% Welfare cost Sd(vf)
IT -2.2766 0.457 -2.2810 0.749 -2.2871 1.143 0.46%
PT -2.2762 0.431 -2.2803 0.700 -2.2859 1.065 0.42%
Est: -2.2787 0.595 -2.2858 1.058 -2.2958 1.703 0.75%
Welfare level at the mean and 5 and 95 posterior probability, welfare cost in terms of
consumption as percentage of the steady state consumption level; in brackets the welfare
gains under the optimal price-level targeting w.r.t. the optimal inﬂation targeting;
Sd(vf) represent the variability of welfare under uncertainty.
49